Reid Blackman - Philosopher - Areas of Specialization: Ethics (esp. history and meta-ethics), Moral Psychology (esp. emotions), Nietzsche; Areas of Competence: Philosophy of Mind, Environmental Ethics, Bio-Ethics, Social & Political Philosophy

Since the Spring of '09, I have been a Visiting Assistant Professor at Colgate University, where I teach Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, Environmental Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, and Introduction to Philosophy. Colgate is in Hamilton, NY, and I'm lucky enough to live on a beautiful lake. I hope this makes you a little jealous. Before Colgate, I was a graduate student at The University of Texas-Austin; I miss Medici and the Greenbelt. Before Texas, I received an M.A. at Northwestern University, and a B.A. at Cornell University. I also passed third grade with flying colors.

To the left is a picture of me. The lack of a smile indicates that I'm a serious scholar while the background demonstrates my willingness to engage with the external world in a more concrete way. There might also be the implication that, like the wave behind me, I'm a force of nature. But a very small one.

CV (including dissertation abstract) (pdf)

Publications

"Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions," in The Southern Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions (pdf)
Most philosophers of emotion endorse a compound account of the emotions: emotions are wholes made of parts, or as I prefer to put it, emotions are mental states that supervene on other (mental) states. The goal of this paper is to ascertain how the intentionality of these subvening members relates to the intentionality of the emotions. Towards this end, I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the problems with the account Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson offer of the intentionality of the emotions; I argue their account is fundamentally misguided by virtue of being motivated by a misunderstanding of the nature of propositional attitudes. Second, I argue against Peter Goldie's claim that an affective component of an emotion contributes to its intentionality. Third, I offer my own compound account of emotions. I argue i) emotions are mental states that supervene on other mental states, ii) the mental states that constitute the subvenience base of emotion can have nonconceptual and/or conceptual representational content, and iii) an emotion's intentionality supervenes on (but is often not identical to) the intentionality of only one of its subvening members, specifically, the evaluative representation.
"Nietzsche's 'Interpretation' in the Genealogy," The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 18 (4) 2010: 693-711.
Nietzsche's "Interpretation" in the Genealogy (pdf)
I argue for a novel interpretation of the third treatise of Nietzsche's "Genealogy," according to which the third treatise consists largely of offering false causal explanations for a set of facts Nietzsche lists in the first section of the treatise. The particular explanations offered, I argue, a function of the evaluative commitments of the person offering the explanations.
Book Review in Ethics, January 2008, of Michael Zimmerman's "The Nature of Intrinsic Value" (pdf)

Research

Ethics and Moral Psychology

My research in meta-ethics includes a defense of a variety of Aristotelianism, though I part from Aristotle and some neo-Aristotelians in thinking that we cannot ground evaluations of people and their lives by appeal to their membership in the kind 'human being'. I defend what I call Cultural Aristotelianism, according to which evaluations of people and their lives are grounded in the non-biological kinds of which they are members, e.g. mother, philosopher, citizen, moral agent, and so on. For more on this, you can see my dissertation abstract, or my papers, "Meta-Ethical Realism with Good of a KInd," and "Two Varieties of Aristotelianism."

My research in moral psychology includes a defense of a view that is related to my meta-ethical view. I think that what it is to have an ideal is a central feature of agency, and that an agent's having an ideal is a matter of various facts striking the agent as reasons, where those facts relate to her being a good member of the kinds of which she is a member. Having the ideal of being a good philosopher, for example, involves seeing the fact that studying Plato would sharpen one's philosophical skills as a reason for studying Plato. For more on this, you can see my, "What is an Ideal?", below.

I have recently become very interested in providing an account of what grounds our reasons for emotions. My most recent research argues for a certain conception of the reasonableness of emotions, and I am working on an argument that demonstrates that the best account of our reasons for emotion is incompatible with internalism (or Humeanism) about practical reason.

Philosophy of Mind/Emotions

Much of my research since completing my graduate degree has focused on the nature of the emotions, viz. what they are and what accounts for their intentionality and rationality. My two most recent papers have included defenses of cognitivism (paper currently under review) and compound accounts of the emotions (forthcoming in The Southern Journal of Philosophy), the latter of which is a view according to which emotions are wholes made of parts. Both positions are tenable, I think, and I argue for versions of those views that allow for sensations and perceptual states with propositional but nonconceptual content.

Nietzsche

My research on Nietzsche is concerned with a theme I discuss in my "Nietzsche's 'Interpretation' in the Genealogy" (above): the extent to which Nietzsche thinks our evaluative judgments are objective. I am currently working on a paper in which I argue against some recent interpretations of Nietzsche, according to which he is a fictionalist or noncognitivist.

Papers in Progress

In Defense of Cognitivism about the Emotions

I defend a cognitivist and functionalist account of the emotions. It is cognitivist in that it identifies emotions with evaluative representations, and it is functionalist in that it claims that which evaluative representations are emotions depends upon the causal relations those representations bear to other mental states and behavior. I further argue that token evaluative representations may have conceptual or nonconceptual representational content.

A copy of the draft is available upon request.
Meta-Ethical Realism with Good of a Kind

I argue that we can and ought to engage in ethical thought using good of a kind to the exclusion of good simpliciter. Employing good of a kind, I claim, allows us to be realists about ethical thought and utterances even if one denies there is anything that is good simpliciter. I defend what I "Cultural Aristotelianism," according to which evaluations of people are grounded in their memberships in cultural kinds, e.g. philosopher, citizen, mother, etc.

A copy of the draft is available upon request.
Two Varieties of Aristotelianism

I argue, contra Foot, Thompson,and Hursthouse, that we cannot ground evaluations of people by appeal to a notion of what constitutes a good human being. I conclude with a sketch of an alternative variety of Aristotelianism (which receives a full treatment in "Meta-Ethical Realism with Good of a Kind").

A copy of the draft is available upon request.
What is an Ideal?

I argue that what it is to have an ideal is distinct from other notions with which philosophers have been concerned, e.g. having a principle, judging what one ought to do, having a desire, etc. I offer an account of what it is to have an ideal in terms of what facts a person takes to be reasons for action and emotion, where those facts bear on a person's being a good (or ideal) member of a kind of which she is or will be a member, e.g. mother, doctor, moral agent, and so on.

A copy of the draft is available upon request.
The Irrelevance of Intrinsic Value

There is a consensus among philosophers that the sort of value of primary interest in moral philosophy is that of final value, or value as an end. There is debate, however, whether the notion of intrinsic value adequately tracks the notion of final value. I argue that the concept 'intrinsic value' is of no use in moral philosophy because it does not track final value, and that its usage obscures other sorts of value previously unappreciated.

A copy of the draft is available upon request.

Teaching

Miscellaneous

Intellikit
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Intellikit is a multi-tiered system for 7 through 14 year olds. There are three books, each appropriate to an age group and each a compilation of short fictional stories, all designed to teach students how to become effective thinkers.

In each story students encounter characters confronted with a dilemma of moral, social, or political import. Students are confronted not only with the different positions characters take on an issue, but the reasons, the reasoning, behind holding the positions they do. Students come to understand what the problem is, how the problem arose, and what different characters in the story want to do to resolve the problem.

Students are asked, through questions seeded throughout the story, to "Think About It!" These "Think About It!" questions ask the student to explain the problem and what the characters think about it. Most importantly, these questions ask the student to evaluate the problem and the different arguments presented. Students are instructed to record their answers in a journal and to discuss their thoughts with other classmates.
Photos
What I try to do when I'm not doing philosophy: Travel, Rock Climb, Hang Glide, and Scuba Dive
What I most often do when I'm not doing philosophy: Stare contemptuously at the selection of songs in my iTunes